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1 Financial Markets 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
       The financial system consists of specialized and non-specialized 
financial institutions, of organized and unorganized financial markets, of 
financial instruments and services, which facilitate transfer of funds. 
Procedures and practices adopted in the markets, and financial 
interrelationships are also parts of this system. In product or other service 
markets, purchasers part with their money in exchange for something now. 
In finance, money “now” is exchanged for a “promise to pay in the future”. 
However, in  product or service markets, if the object sold – from a car to a 
haircut – is defective, the buyers often find out relatively soon.1 On the other 
hand, loan quality is not readily observable for quite some time and can be 
hidden for extensive periods. Moreover, banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries can also alter the risk composition of their assets more 
quickly than most non-financial industries, and banks can readily hide 
problems by extending loans to clients that cannot service previous debt 
obligations. Theoretically, the financial market facilitates allocation of 
resources efficiently, which involves quick dissemination of information and 
reaction to it. 
 The financial markets are susceptible to manipulation as some 
participants have information that others do not that is information 
asymmetry is ubiquitous in financial markets. To overcome this problem 
corporate governance is required to ensure that suppliers of finance to 
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corporations are assured that they get their return on their investment2. 
Despite the existence of institutional and legal framework numerous 
financial scams continue to be perpetuated both in developed and developing 
countries. 
 
1.2 The objectives of this study are : 
 
a) To examine some of the major misdemeanors which perpetuated in the 
financial system in 1991 and 2001 in India . 
b) Understand  the financial  regulatory measures which have been adopted  
after the 1991 share scam in India and why despite such measures adopted  
security scam has recurred in  2001. 
c) Examine the theoretical structure of corporate governance for analyzing 
security scams that have occurred in the 1990s and the new millennium. 
The second section contains a summary of the events that occurred leading 
to the share scams and financial frauds in India and abroad during the recent 
decade that shook the financial markets. The third section surveys the 
rationale for regulation of securities markets and the functional procedures 
adopted in India in the aftermath of the scams. The fourth section looks at 
the theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance which, is followed by 
a discussion of the shortcomings of the regulatory set up in India which fails 
to prevent the recurrence of financial misdemeanors.  
Financial Liberalization is a phenomenon that is almost all pervasive in the 
world today. While liberalization has led to substantial benefits in terms of 
increased transparency, it has ushered in opportunities of corporate 
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misgovernance. This implies that the mechanism by which legal institutions 
ensure that suppliers of funds receive the return on investment is not 
sufficient or appropriate. Recent trends through the 1990s in India and 
abroad reveal how corporate governance has not been effective permitting 
unscrupulous and opportunistic individuals to manipulate the market in their 
favor.  The process of financial market regulation ensures that important 
guidelines are issued regarding how primary dealers (brokers) should 
operate with regards to mode of operation, conduct, litigation, amount of 
business to be handled, management of risk, internal control etc. 
These security scams and financial scandals discussed here involved 
the manipulation of huge amounts of money. The perpetrators of these gross 
transgression had such a comprehensive knowledge of how the system 
worked that they manipulated it to their advantage operating in an 
opportunistic manner3. The essence of the argument in  is that the occurrence 
and reoccurrence of such security scams and financial scandals can be 
attributed to a failure of corporate governance in finance4 despite the 
existence of an functioning regulatory authority empowered with the legal 
sanctions. 







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4
 Sanyal. Sreejata, Regulation of Securities Markets in India’1997, Ph.D. 
2 Security Scam: Introduction  
A security scam has the following features: 
a)manipulation in share prices. 
b)monopoly in dealing with a huge number of shares of a company. 
c)money laundering-borrowing money to trade in securities but using the 
funds for unconnected purposes.5 According to the Securities Exchange 
Act(1934)SEA-"It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any act, 
practice or course of action which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon nay person in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security." While understanding the causes or possible mechanisms by which 
a security scam takes places we can on a parallel plane understand the 
motives for financial market regulation otherwise called the economics of 
financial market regulation. There is a certain systemic risk involved if 
brokers or banks get into settlement problems during the process of 
transacting in securities. If so, it results in a domino effect, which could 
create problems for other banks and brokers in the system. A systemic risk 
also can occur when there is not enough liquidity in the system due to very 
few brokers, monopolizing in the transaction of a security. Also insider 
trading is another problem when traders who are insiders to an organization 
trade when they have superior knowledge which is considered unfair and an 
extension of asymmetric information. Also concentration tendencies of 
traders towards dealing in one security only should be avoided. There is also 
a consumer protection to ensure that the price formation process is efficient 
as possible and also to ensure sufficient competition among traders, brokers 
and other market participants. 
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 "Securities and Exchange Commission: Securities fraud and insider trading", Palgraves’ Dictionary Of Money And 
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Table 1:Scams in India 
 
Year Victim Perpetrator Mechanism Economics Of 
Financial Market 
Regulation 
Misdemeanor 
1991 Public buyers 
of shares of 
companies 
dealt with by 
manipulators, 
National 
Housing 
Bank(NHB) 
State Bank 
Of 
Saurashtra 
SBI Capital 
Markets 
Ltd(SBI 
Caps) 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
 
 
Harshad 
Mehta,Hiten 
Dalal, Batliwala 
& Karani 
,M/s V.B. Desai 
, N.K. 
Aggarwala & 
Co., Mukesh 
Babu etc. 
 
Borrow money from banks 
on a ready forward basis 
thus violating RBI 
guidelines and dealing in 
security transactions with 
banks where issue of bank 
receipts and SGL forms 
were not supported by 
genuine holding of 
securities 
6Clearing and 
settlements 
problem(Systemic 
Risk),Money 
Laundering 
2001 Public,Buyer
s of shares of 
companies 
dealt with by 
manipulators,
UTI,MMCB,
Calcutta 
Stock 
Exchange 
Ketan Parekh  Same as above but in this 
case much of the 
transactions had taken place 
through companies owned 
by Ketan 
Parekh,FII's(Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors,Banks ,Unit 
Trust Of India 
7Clearing and 
Settlement 
Problem,Money 
Laundering 
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2.1  Security Scam In India-1991 
 
In April 1992, press reports indicated that there was a shortfall in the 
Government Securities held by the State Bank of India. Investigations 
uncovered the tip of an iceberg, later called the securities scam, involving 
misappropriation of funds to the tune of over Rs. 3500 Crores8. The scam 
engulfed top executives of large nationalized banks, foreign banks and 
financial institutions, brokers, bureaucrats and politicians: The functioning 
of the money market and the stock market was thrown in disarray. The 
tainted shares were worthless as they could not be sold. This created a panic 
among investors and brokers and led  to a prolonged closure of the stock 
exchanges along with a precipitous drop in the price of shares. Soon after the 
discovery of the scam, the stock prices dropped by over 40%, wiping out 
market value to the tune of Rs. 100,000 crores. The normal settlement 
process in government securities was that the transacting banks made 
payments and delivered the securities directly to each other. The broker's 
only function was to bring the buyer and seller together. During the scam, 
however, the banks or at least some banks adopted an alternative settlement 
process similar to settlement of stock market transactions. The deliveries of 
securities and payments were made through the broker. That is, the seller 
handed over the securities to the broker who passed them on to the buyer, 
while the buyer gave the cheque to the broker who then made the payment to 
the seller. There were two important reasons why the broker intermediated 
settlement began to be used in the government securities markets: 
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 Stock market Scam in India of 1991:The Janakiraman Committee Report 
• The brokers instead of merely bringing buyers and sellers together started 
taking positions in the market. They in a sense imparted greater liquidity to 
the markets. 
• When a bank wanted to conceal the fact that it was doing an 9Ready 
Forward deal, the broker came in handy. The broker provided contract notes 
for this purpose with fictitious counterparties, but arranged for the actual 
settlement to take place with the correct counterparty. This allowed the 
broker to lay his hands on the cheque as it went from one bank to another 
through him. The hurdle now was to find a way of crediting the cheque to 
his account though it was drawn in favour of a bank and was crossed 
account payee. It is purely a matter of banking custom that an account payee 
cheque is paid only to the payee mentioned on the cheque. In fact, privileged 
(corporate) customers were routinely allowed to credit account payee 
cheques in favour of a bank into their own accounts to avoid clearing delays, 
thereby reducing the interest lost on the amount. The brokers thus found a 
way of getting hold of the cheques as they went from one bank to another 
and crediting the amounts to their accounts. This effectively transformed an 
RF into a loan to a broker rather than to a bank. But this, by itself, would not 
have led to the scam because the RF after all is a secured loan, and a secured 
loan to a broker is still secured. What was necessary now was to find a way 
of eliminating the security itself. 
Three routes adopted for this purpose were: 
• Some banks (or rather their officials) were persuaded to part with cheques 
without actually receiving securities in return. A simple explanation of this 
is that the officials concerned were bribed and/or negligent. Alternatively, as 
long as the scam lasted, the banks benefited from such an arrangement. The 
management of banks might have been sorely tempted to adopt this route to 
higher profitability. 
• The second route was to replace the actual securities by a worthless piece 
of paper – a fake 10Bank Receipt (BR). A BR like an IOU has only the 
borrower's assurance that the borrower has the securities which can/will be 
delivered if/when the need arises. 
• The third method was simply to forge the securities themselves. In many 
cases, PSU bonds were represented only by allotment letters rather than 
certificates on security paper. However, it accounted for only a very small 
part of the total funds misappropriated. During the scam, the brokers 
perfected the art of using fake BRs to obtain unsecured loans from the 
banking system. They persuaded some small and little known banks – the 
Bank of Karad (BOK) and the Metropolitan Cooperative Bank (MCB) - to 
issue BRs as and when required. These BRs could then be used to do RF 
deals with other banks. The cheques in favour of BOK were, of course, 
credited into the brokers' accounts. In effect, several large banks made huge 
unsecured loans to the BOK/MCB which in turn made the money available 
to the brokers. 
 
2.2 Security Scam in India-2001 
In Spite of the recommendations made by the Janakiraman Committee 
Report in 1992 to prevent security scams from happening in the future 
another security market took place in 2001. This involved the actions of one 
major player by the name of Ketan Parekh. He manipulated a large amount 
of funds in the capital market though a number of his own companies which 
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is probably why the scam remained a mystery for quite some time the 
RBI,SEBI and DCA(Department Of Company affairs) had gone slack in 
their regulatory operations.During 1999 and 2000 the SENSEX reached a 
high and after than the stock market crashed in 2001.Some of the major 
companies he invested in were 11Nirma, Adani Group, Essel Group,DSQ and 
Zee Cadila.Ketan Parekh manipulated the stock market through FII's 
(Foreign Institutional Investors), OCB's (Overseas Commercial 
Borrowings),Banks and Mutual Funds(Unit Trust Of India). In fact an 
important extension of this scam remains the Unit Trust Of India Scam. 
 
2.3 UTI Scam             
Of all the recent encounters of the Indian public with the much-celebrated 
forces of the market, the Unit Trust’s US-64 debacle is the worst12. Its 
gravity far exceeds the stock market downswing of the mid-1990s, which 
wiped out Rs. 20,000 crores in savings. 13The debacle is part of the recent 
economic slowdown which has eliminated one million jobs and also burst 
the information technology (IT) bubble. This has tragically led to suicides by 
investors. And  then suspension of trading in US-64made the hapless 
investors more dejected at the sinking of this "super-safe" public sector 
instrument that had delivered a regular return since 1964. There is a larger 
lesson in the US-64 debacle for policies towards public savings and public 
sector undertakings (PSUs). The US-64 crisis is rooted in plain 
mismanagement. US-64 was launched as a steady income fund. Logically, it 
should have invested in debt, especially low-risk fixed-income government 
bonds. Instead, its managers increasingly invested in equities, with high-risk 
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speculative returns.In the late 1980s UTI was "politicised" with other 
financial institutions (FIs) such as LIC and GIC, and made to invest in 
certain favoured scrips. By the mid-1990s, equities exceeded debt in its 
portfolio. The FIs were also used to "boost the market" artificially as an 
"endorsement" of controversial economic policies. In the past couple of 
years, UTI made downright imprudent but heavy investments in stocks from 
Ketan Parekh’s favourite K-10 portfolio, such as Himachal Futuristic, 
Global Tele and DSQ. These "technology" investments took place despite 
indications that the "technology boom" had ended. US-64 lost half its Rs. 
30,000 crore portfolio value within a year. UTI sank Rs. 3,400 crores in just 
six out of a portfolio of 44 scrips. This eroded by 60 percent. Early this year, 
US-64’s net asset value plunged below par (Rs.10). But it was re-purchasing 
US-64 above Rs. 14! Today, its NAV stands at Rs. 8.30 - a massive loss for 
13 million unit-holders.It is inconceivable that UTI made these fateful 
investment decisions on its own. According to insiders, the Finance Ministry 
substantially influenced them: all major decisions need high-level political 
approval. Indeed, collusion between the FIs, and shady operators like 
Harshad Mehta, was central to the Securities Scam of 1992. The Joint 
Parliamentary Committee’s report documents this. In recent months, the 
Finance Ministry became desperate to reverse the post-Budget market 
downturn. UTI’s misinvestment now coincided with the global technology 
"meltdown." US-64 crashed. UTI chairman resigned. Although culpable, he 
was probably a scapegoat too. The Ministry has kept a close watch on UTI, 
especially since 1999.The US-64 debacle, then, is not just a UTI scam. It is a 
governance scam involving mismanagement by a government frustrated at 
the failure of its macroeconomic calculations. This should have ensured the 
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Finance Minister’s exit in any democracy which respects parliamentary 
norms. There are larger lessons in the UTI debacle. If a well-established, and 
until recently well-managed, institution like UTI cannot safeguard public 
savings, then we should not allow the most precious of such savings - 
pensions - to be put at risk. Such risky investment is banned in many self-
avowedly capitalist European economies. In India, the argument acquires 
greater force given the poorly regulated, extremely volatile, stock market—
where a dozen brokers control 90 percent of trade. Yet, there is a proposal 
by the Finance Ministry to privatize pensions and provident funds. Basically, 
the government, deplorably, wants to get rid of its annual pension obligation 
of Rs. 22,000 crores.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:Security Scams in some Developed Countries  
Year Country Victim Perpetrator Mechanism Misdemeanor in 
Economics of 
financial  
regulation' 
1995 U.K. Barings 
Bank 
Nick Leeson Excessive arbitraging 
in futures trading 
between the Singapore 
Monetary 
Exchange(SIMEX) 
and Osaka Stock 
Exchange(OSE) 
Systemic 
Risk,Settlements 
Problem 
2001 U.S.A. Enron Enron 
Executives 
Manufacture losses by 
mismanagement of 
capital structure 
through SPEs (Special 
Purpose 
Entities),hiding losses, 
keeping debt off books 
Insider 
Trading,Bad 
Accountability 
1990 Luxemburg BCCI 
and 
Sheikh 
Zayid of 
Abu 
Dhabi 
  
The owner 
Agha Hasan 
Abedi and two 
shipping 
magnates from 
Pakistan The 
Gokal Brothers 
 
Inflating loans from 
the bank by the two 
brothers for their 
shipping busness, 
arbitraging in 
derivatives market of 
Gulf through The 
BCCI-Gulf Transport 
Group consortium  
 which lead to huge 
losses 
Money 
Laundering,, 
Systemic Risk 
 
2.4  Barings Bank 
The aftermath of the bankruptcy of Barings Bank provides an excellent case 
study of 14systemic risk. Representative Those who cite Barings as an 
example of derivatives causing market failures point to the fact that the 
authorities in Shanghai temporarily closed its bond-futures market and told 
investors to wind down positions in an attempt to limit damage from a 
trading scandal. In addition, they argue that "if anything, the Barings name 
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may have contributed to its undoing, if it turns out to have been the bank's 
familiarity that blinded the authorities at Singapore's futures exchange to the 
enormous wrong-way bet its trader made on the future direction of Japan's 
Nikkei average." A closer look at the reaction of market participants and 
volatility after the fall may provide insight into the magnitude of the 
contagion effect. Barings' young trader Nicholas Leeson was supposed to be 
"arbitraging", seeking to profit from differences in the prices of Nikkei-225 
futures contracts listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) in Japan 
and Singapore Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Such arbitrage involves 
buying futures contracts on one market and selling them on another. Since 
the margins on this are small, the volumes traded by arbitrageurs tend to be 
large. However, this strategy is not very risky: a long position in one market 
(betting on a rise) is offset by a short position (betting on a fall) in the other). 
However, in addition to arbitraging the Osaka Exchange and the SIMEX, as 
far back as September 1994, Leeson began to simultaneously sell put options 
and call options on Nikkei-225 futures. This type of deal is known as a 
"straddle." If the market is less volatile than the options prices predict, the 
seller makes a profit. However, as a result of the Kobe earthquake, the 
Nikkei-225 fluctuated and Leeson began to exponentially increase the size 
of his open positions. By trading on a fraudulent account, numbered 88888, 
Leeson began to buy futures on a large scale in an attempt to almost single-
handedly push up the Nikkei 225. This proved unsuccessful and eventually 
Leeson's losses were so large the bank eventually collapsed. A lifeboat by 
the Bank of England was not feasible due to the fact that many of the 
derivatives were impossible to wind down immediately, as the options did 
not expire for months. While this case has been widely cited as providing 
evidence of a market failure, others argue that the systemic risk from the loss 
was minimal. Others argue that in the event of a viable threat of systemic 
risk, the Bank of England would have bailed out Barings Bank, but the 
precise magnitude of the systemic risk is not known. Reports in the Wall 
Street Journal immediately following the collapse of Barings express that the 
markets were "shaken" but provide no quantifiable estimate of the effect of 
the collapse. 
 
2.5 The BCCI (The Bank Of Credit and Commerce International)  
Affair 
 
The perpetrators in this case were two brothers,the Gokal brothers, who were 
shipping magnates. The fraudulent brothers and BCCI's founder Agha Hasan 
Abedi, shared the confidence of a new world balance of power centered on 
the massive Middle East oil deposits. Agha Hasan Abedi went as far as to 
fund a very readable business magazine called SOUTH which was a 
welcome relief from the USA propaganda to be found in TIME and 
NEWSWEEK. BCCI's loans  through Agha Hasan Abedi to the brothers 
shipping business were inflated, and their quality was upgraded by forgery. 
The fraud went on for over a decade.. The BCCI-Gulf Transport Group 
consortium wanted to dip their fingers into the coffers of one of their best 
sponsors, Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. The reason for this was the financial 
hole left by huge losses suffered by Gulf on the derivatives market.  It is 
certainly true that Sheikh Zayid started to pick up the losses in 1990. This 
leaves open the argument of many muslims that the bank did not have to fail. 
There is also deception in the way that  one of the perpetrators was brought 
to justice. He was flying to the USA in order to clear himself of liability for 
abbetting in the production of a Pakistani nuclear bomb. Almost any high-
tech metallurgy going to a third world country is suspect. In the same way 
developments of high tech chemical refining processes or pharmaceutical 
products in the Third World are accused of forwarding chemical warfare or 
illicit drug refining ventures. The perpetrator took the plane from Karachi to 
New York in l994. British police arrested him during a refuelling stop at 
Frankfurt.  
 
2.6 The Enron Case 
At the heart of Enron's demise was the creation of partnerships with shell 
companies, these shell companies, run by Enron executives who profited 
richly from them, allowed Enron to keep hundreds of millions of dollars in 
debt off its books. But once stock analysts and financial journalists heard 
about these arrangements, investors began to lose confidence in the 
company's finances. The results: a run on the stock, lowered credit ratings 
and insolvency. According to claims and counter-claims filed in Delaware 
court hearings(of the Enron Case); many of the most prominent names in 
world finance - including Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, CIBC, Deutsche 
Bank and Dresdner Bank - were still involved in the partnership, directly or 
indirectly, when Enron filed for bankruptcy. Originally, it appears that 
initially Enron was using 15SPE's(Special Purpose Entities) appropriately by 
placing non energy-related business into separate legal entities. What they 
did wrong was that they apparently tried to manufacture earnings by 
manipulating the capital structure of the SPEs; hide their losses; did not have 
independent outside partners that prevented full disclosure and did not 
disclose the risks in their financial statements. There should be no 
interlocking management: The managers of the off balance sheet entity 
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cannot be the same as the parent company in order to avoid conflicts of 
interest. The ownership percentage of the off balance sheet entity should be 
higher than 3% and the outside investors should not be controlled or 
affiliated with the parent: This was clearly not the case at Enron.  Enron, in 
order to circumvent the outside ownership rules funneled money through a 
series of partnerships that appeared to be independent businesses, but which 
were controlled by Enron management. The scope and importance of the 
off-balance sheet vehicles were not widely known among investors in Enron 
stock, but they were no secret to many Wall Street firms. By the end of 
1999, according to company estimates, it had moved $27bn of its total 
$60bn in assets off balance sheet. 
These security scams and financial scandals examined in the section above 
involved the manipulation of huge amounts of money. The purpose of the 
“traders” or “investors” was not genuine. The perpetrators had such a 
comprehensive knowledge of how the system worked that they manipulated 
it to their advantage operating in an opportunistic manner16. The crux of the 
argument in this work is that the occurrence and reoccurrence of such 
security scams and financial scandals can be attributed to a failure of 
corporate governance in finance17 despite the existence of an functioning 
regulatory authority empowered with the legal sanctions. 
 

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3 Financial Market Regulation (Rationale) 
The nature of securities markets is such that they are inherently susceptible 
to failures due to the existence of information asymmetries and existence of 
high transaction costs Sanyal (1997). It needs to be emphasized that when 
securities markets come into existence, the interest of the member brokers 
are taken care of through margin requirements, barriers to entry of 
membership, listing agreements. However the investors/clients who buy and 
sell via their brokers are not able to form an organization to safeguard their 
interests due to the cost of creation of such organizations and free rider 
problems. The distinctive nature of the market can be observed with 
reference to the commodity, its quality, the system of transactions and the 
participants in the market, as follows: 
(a) the commodity(the security)has a life to perpetuity. 
(b) while the outcome of the contract say the redemption of debt is certain, 
in the case of the government, it is not always so in the case of a private debt 
instrument, hence uncertainty comes into focus. 
(c) the quality of private debt instrument is unobservable and hence, it is the 
trust reposed on the trader or the issuer that is the decisive factor, here the 
problem of information comes into focus. 
(d) in any securities market in any transaction or deal there are at least four 
participants, two clients and two brokers. The brokers negotiate deals with 
each other on behalf of their clients and thus the problem of transaction cost 
comes into focus. When there is so much scope for failure and opportunism, 
there appears to be substantial ground for prescribing an institution that 
oversees the market at different stages to ensure its reliability, efficiency and  
it's very existence. 
 
 3.1 Objective of Financial Market Regulation  
The objective of regulation and supervision is to facilitate the efficient and 
fair performance of economic functions, but a practical regulatory structure 
must deal with (and will influence) the products and institutions through 
which those functions are performed. This creates considerable complexities 
because there is no unique relationship between functions, products, and 
institutions. Several products might perform the same function, some 
functions might involve several products, institutions can provide a range of 
products, and these relationships can be changing over time, in response to 
technological change and in ways influenced by the existing regulatory 
structure. One focus of financial regulation is upon the characteristics of 
financial products, which are explicit or implicit contracts between parties, 
entered into with certain expectations on the basis of information held by 
those parties. Financial regulation stems in large part from the undesirable 
consequences of participants entering contracts with inappropriate 
expectations based on imperfect information. Participants may be unable to 
obtain information to appropriately evaluate the ability of a counter-party to 
meet a contractual obligation (such as payment of an insurance benefit), or 
may be given incorrect information which leads them to form inappropriate 
expectations of performance (such as of a managed fund). Ultimately, the 
focus of a regulatory structure must be on the welfare of the end users.  
Financial products are contracts between two parties, issued under specific 
legal arrangements. While there may be an argument that individuals have a 
"natural" right to enter into such contracts as deposit takers, there is no 
"natural" right possessed by institutions, which allows them to do so. That is 
recognized internationally by financial legislation of most nations, which 
impose certain socially determined criteria upon institutions (institutional 
form, identity of owners, competence of managers, compliance with 
prudential standards etc.) if they are to be allowed to undertake such 
activities. Also they should be a good incentive structure for providing 
information in financial markets as information is very important to the 
investor. Often investors find it difficult to evaluate the quality of the 
security or service offered which calls for an intermediary to disseminate 
information and services that have to be regulated. Regulations also prevent 
monopoly of capital markets which otherwise jeopardize the market 
mechanism.  
 
 Here is a table indicating regulatory bodies of financial markets 
around the world.  
Table 3:Financial Market Regulation around the World 
Country Regulatory Body 
India RBI(Reserve Bank Of India),SEBI(Securities Exchange Board of 
India) 
United Kingdom SIB(Securities Investment Board) 
Netherlands Securities Board 
U.S.A. SEC(Securities Exchange Commission) 
 
A security scam involves the manipulation of funds in the capital market 
which could involve the usage of funds for highly speculative purposes 
resulting in the monopolization of capital market, trading in shares with 
money not used for their actual purpose etc. 
  
 
 
  
3.2 Financial Market Regulation in India 
3.2 (a) Guidelines Issued by Reserve Bank of India for the Regulation of 
Financial Markets 
 
1) Management oversight, policy/operational guidelines18 - The 
management of a Primary Dealer should bear primary responsibility 
for ensuring maintenance of appropriate standards of conduct and 
adherence to proper procedures by the entity. Primary Dealers (PD) 
should frame and implement suitable policy guidelines on securities 
transactions. Operational procedures and controls in relation to the 
day-to-day business operations should also be worked out and put in 
place to ensure that operations in securities are conducted in 
accordance with sound and acceptable business practices. With the 
approval of respective Boards, the PDs should clearly lay down the 
broad objectives to be followed while undertaking transactions in 
securities on their own account and on behalf of clients, clearly define 
the authority to put through deals, procedure to be followed while 
putting through deals, and adhere to prudential exposure limits, policy 
regarding dealings with brokers, systems for management of various 
risks, guidelines for valuation of the portfolio and the reporting 
systems etc. While laying down such policy guidelines, the Primary 
Dealers should strictly observe Reserve Bank’s instructions on the 
following: 
1) Ready Forward deals 
2) Transactions through SGL Account 
3) Internal Controls/Risk Management System 
4) Dealings through Brokers 
5) Accounting Standards 
6) Audit, Review and Reporting 
Any other instructions issued from time to time The internal policy 
guidelines on securities transactions framed by the PD, duly certified by its 
management to the effect that they are in accordance with the RBI 
guidelines and that they have been put in place, may be perused by the 
Statutory Auditors and commented upon as to the conformity of the 
guidelines with the instructions/guidelines issued by RBI. The effectiveness 
of the policy and operational guidelines should be periodically evaluated. 
2) Prohibition of short selling of securities - The Primary Dealers should not 
put through any sale transaction without actually holding the security in its 
portfolio i.e. under no circumstances, a PD should hold a oversold position 
in any security.  
3) Concurrent audit of securities transactions - Securities transactions should 
be separately subjected to a concurrent audit by internal/external auditors to 
the  extent of 100% and the results of the audit should be placed before the 
CEO(Chief Operating Officer)/ CMD(Chief Managing Director) of the PD 
once every month. The compliance wing should monitor the compliance on 
ongoing basis, with the laid down policies and prescribed procedures, the 
applicable legal and regulatory requirements, the deficiencies pointed out in 
the audits and report directly to the management. 
4) All problem exposures where security of doubtful value, diminution of 
value to be provided for - All problem exposures, if any, which are not 
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backed by any security or backed by security of doubtful value should be 
fully provided for. 
5) Provision also for suits under litigation - Even in cases where a PD has 
filed suit against another party for recovery, such exposures should be 
evaluated and provisions should be made to the satisfaction of auditors. 
6) Claims against the PD to be taken note of and provisions made - Any 
claim against the PD should also be taken note of and provisions made to the 
satisfaction of auditors. 
7) Problem exposures to be reflected clearly in Profit and Loss Account - 
The profit and loss account should, reflect the problem exposures, if any, as 
also the effect of valuation of portfolio, as per the instructions issued by the 
Reserve Bank, if any, from time to time. The report of the statutory auditors 
should contain a certification to this effect. 
8) Business through brokers and contract limits for approved brokers - A 
disproportionate part of the business should not be transacted through only 
one or a few brokers. PDs should fix aggregate contract limits for each of the 
approved brokers. A limit of 5%, of total transactions (both purchase and 
sales) entered into by a PD during a year should be treated as the aggregate 
upper contract limit for each of the approved brokers. This limit should 
cover both the business initiated by a PD and the business offered/brought to 
the PD by a broker. PDs should ensure that the transactions entered into 
through individual brokers during a year normally does not exceed this limit. 
However, the norm would not be applicable to PD’s dealings through other 
Primary Dealers. 
9) Investments in and Underwriting of Shares, Debentures and PSU Bonds 
and Investments in Units of Mutual Funds-Guidelines.  PDs should 
formulate, within the above parameters, their own internal guidelines, as 
approved by their Board of Directors, on securities transactions either by 
directly subscribing or through secondary market with counter-party or 
counter-party group, including norms to ensure that excessive exposure 
against any single counter-party or group or product is avoided and that due 
attention is given to the maturity structure and the quality of such 
transactions. The PDs will also need to take into account the fact that such 
securities are subject to risk weight and necessary depreciation has to be 
fully provided for. 
10) Material changes in circumstances - The PDs should report any material 
changes in circumstances such as change in the ownership structure, 
business profile, organization etc. affecting the conditions of licensing as PD 
to RBI immediately. 
 
3.2 (b) Guidelines Issued by Securities and Exchange Board of India  for 
the Regulation of Securities Markets 
 
1)Prohibition of certain dealings in securities  
a) No person shall buy, sell or otherwise deal in securities in a fraudulent 
manner.  
2)Prohibition against Market Manipulation  
 No person shall -  
(a) effect, take part in, or enter into, either directly or indirectly, 
transactions in securities, with the intention of artificially raising or 
depressing the prices of securities and thereby inducing the sale or 
purchase of securities by any person;  
(b) indulge in any act, which is calculated to create a false or 
misleading appearance of trading on the securities market;  
(c) indulge in any act which results in reflection of prices of securities 
based on transactions that are not genuine trade transactions;  
(d) enter into a purchase or sale of any securities, not intended to 
effect transfer of beneficial ownership but intended to operate only as 
a device to inflate, depress, or cause fluctuations in the market price of 
securities;  
(e) pay, offer or agree to pay or offer, directly or indirectly, to any 
person any money or money's worth for inducing another person to 
purchase or sell any security with the sole object of inflating, 
depressing, or causing fluctuations in the market price of securities19. 
3) Prohibition of misleading statements to induce sale or purchase of 
securities  
No person shall make any statement, or disseminate any information which -  
(a) is misleading in a material particular; and  
(b) is likely to induce the sale or purchase of securities by any other 
person or is likely to have the effect of increasing or depressing the 
market price of securities, if when he makes the statement or 
disseminates the information-  
(i) he does not care whether the statement or information is true 
or false; or  
(ii) he knows, or ought reasonably to have known that the 
statement or information is misleading in any material 
particular. 
Nothing in this sub-regulation shall apply to any general comments made in 
good faith in regard to -  
(a) the economic policy of the Government,  
(b) the economic situation in the country,  
(c) trends in the securities markets, or  
(d) any other matter of a similar nature, whether such comments be 
made in public or in private. 
4) Prohibition on unfair trade practice relating to securities  
 No person shall -  
(a) in the course of his business, knowingly engage in any act, or 
practice which would operate as a fraud upon any person in 
connection with the purchase or sale of, or any other dealing in, any 
securities;  
(b) on his own behalf or on behalf of any person, knowingly buy, sell 
or otherwise deal in securities, pending the execution of any order of 
his client relating to the same security for purchase, sale or other 
dealings in respect of securities.  
Nothing contained in this clause shall apply where according to the 
clients instruction, the transaction for the client is to be effected only 
under specified conditions or in specified circumstances;  
(c) intentionally and in contravention of any law for the time being in 
force delays the transfer of securities in the name of the transferee or 
the dispatch of securities or connected documents to any transferee;  
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(d) Indulge in falsification of the books, accounts and records 
(whether maintained manually or in computer or in any other form);  
(e) When acting as an agent, execute a transaction with a client at a 
price other than the price at which the transaction was executed by 
him, whether on a stock exchange or otherwise, or at a price other 
than the price at which it was offset against the transaction of another 
client 
3.3 Economics of Financial Market Regulation 
 This section includes the motives behind financial market regulation. There 
are several factors which motivate financial market regulation. One if them 
is the systemic risk .Individual agents take into consideration only the 
private cost and often forget the social cost involved in their transactions.If 
one trader finds difficulty in delivering the proposed security under 
consideration it could set a chain or reactions which could affect several 
other traders in the system.So will be the case if banks get into settlement 
problems or failures.It could affect several other banks and traders in the 
system.Also it should be ensured that there is enough liquidity in the system. 
This can be allowed by making sure that there is perfect competition and 
removing barriers to entry-the more traders in the system, more liquidity. 
Also insider trading should be prohibited-i.e when some traders possess 
superior information than other which cause the latter to get suboptimal 
returns in transactions. This can be corrected by having an investment 
banker to mediate between traders and ensuring an adequate supply of 
information. Insider trading allows people to manipulate with prices and 
cause monopolised holding of shares. As more and more traders access the 
system it leads to benefits(positive externalities) to all as opposed to 
monopoly. Such a monopoly condition is more a characteristic of security 
markets because of the associated low transaction costs and greater 
regulation which raise the barriers to entry. Also these is need for consumer 
protection to ensure that the price formation process is as efficient as 
possible. Consumers are better off in a more efficient market than a less 
efficient one. A more efficient market can be ensured by reducing 
asymmetric information. Principal agent relationships are common in 
securities markets. Retail investors typically invest in different funds and 
other financial services firms. Here the former are principals and the latter 
agents. It is essentially than in all transactions agents do not deviate from 
what they are bound to so as mentioned in the contract. Also money which is 
used for the transaction of securities should not be used for any king of 
personal benefit of traders nor should drug traders or criminals be allowed to 
trade in securities thereby allowing themselves to perpetuate their evil deeds. 
 
3.3 a)The Systemic Risk Motive 
The prime objective of most existing financial regulation and supervision is 
to ensure that no systemic risks will threaten the financial system. 20In 
principle, there are two assumptions underlying the concept of systemic risk. 
The first assumption is the existence of a market failure, often in terms of an 
externality. The individual agents only take the private costs into account 
and any “potential social cost [or benefit] is not incorporated in the decision 
making” of the agents. For instance, if one trader encounters problems in 
delivering the securities after a trade, problems may easily spread to other 
agents through the settlement system. The existence of an externality is 
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however not enough to create a systemic risk. The scope of the effect is also 
at hand. The second assumption is based on the notion that if problems 
occur, they “would damage the financial system to such an extent that 
economic activity in the wider economy would suffer.” The traditional 
example of systemic risks is when financial problems in one bank lead to a 
bank run which in turn undermines the confidence in the whole banking 
system, makes the payment system collapse, the money supply contract and 
potentially results in a recession or even depression. In this case, the effects 
on other banks and economic agents, let alone the social costs of a general 
depression, are not taken into account in the risk analysis of the bank or the 
agent. In this paper, the focus is not on banking issues but on the problems 
related to the securities markets. In terms of systemic risks resulting from 
activities in financial markets, there are two main concerns , a) the 
settlement systems and b) the liquidity of the markets. Even though the focus 
of the paper is not on banking issues, in practice the banks play such an 
important role in the payment and therefore in the settlement of financial 
securities that banks and other financial intermediaries cannot be completely 
ignored in a discussion of securities regulation. 
  
3.3 b)Clearing and Settlement 
The clearing and settlement of financial securities entails several problems. 
First, if a seller of a financial security is not able to deliver, it may cause 
delivery problems in other transactions, i.e. have domino effects on many 
other traders. If one trader is unable to fulfill her obligations, all her 
counterparts could run into problems, thus spreading the financial instability. 
The netting, used in most settlement systems, makes many transactions 
dependent on each other and therefore amplifies this problem. Second, a 
dominating and increasing part of the daily flows in the payment system 
emanates form the securities markets and the payment system is a vital part 
of the financial infrastructure. Most other activities rely on a well-
functioning payment system. If the payment system would collapse all other 
economic activity would run into serious problems. It is difficult to imaging 
any economic activity, which does not involve payments. Therefore, a 
disruption in the settlement of financial securities may have far reaching 
consequences for the entire economy. Furthermore, clearing and settlement 
organizations have features similar to natural monopolies. There are 
substantial economies of scale. As a consequence, most countries only have 
one settlement organization, at least for the same type of financial securities. 
If such an organization would default due to technical problems or fraud, 
settlement may be difficult and the risk of major macroeconomic 
disturbances is not negligible. There are however not only operational 
reasons for systemic risks. Such risks are also present if financial problems 
for one agent involved in the system spread to other agents. The typical way 
to deal with this systemic problem is to set up different forms of prudential 
regulation, including stringent supervision standards. Normally the central 
bank assumes responsibility of the payment system, while the clearing and 
settlement organizations often fall under the jurisdiction of the general 
financial supervision. Given the special status and importance of the clearing 
and settlement organizations, it has even been argued that they should be 
governed more like public utilities than as privately held companies. In any 
case, by imposing regulations on the clearing and settlement as well as the 
payment systems, there is clearly a risk of inducing moral hazard, by 
increasing the agents’ propensity to take risks, and thus raising the 
probability of systemic problems. 
 3.3 c)Market Liquidity 
Another type of systemic risks emanates from the fact that liquidity in the 
securities markets has externality features. “Investors want three things from 
markets: liquidity, liquidity and liquidity.” As a consequence, most investors 
will prefer to trade when liquidity is as high as possible, i.e. when and where 
most other investors trade. Also, if one agent supplies more liquidity, 
everybody gains, since the service provided by the liquidity supplier is 
available to everybody in the market. Thus, as more traders access a certain 
trading system, the benefits for everybody in the trading system will rise. 
Also, while trading in a market, or supplying liquidity, agents are not likely 
to take the aggregated benefit to all other agents of the increased liquidity 
into account, i.e. liquidity has a positive externality. Thus, market liquidity 
feeds market liquidity. However, there is a backside of the coin as well. If 
liquidity falls it may also disappear fast. Thus, there is a substantial risk that 
liquidity will dry up if a crisis occurs, in ways similar to what happened at 
the stock market crash of 1987. In a crisis the cost of supplying liquidity is 
likely to increase. Thus, when liquidity is most needed, it may become 
increasingly scarce. In this sense the first requirement for a systemic risk is 
fulfilled, i.e. there is a potential market failure. As a consequence, many 
agents, especially financial intermediaries, are increasingly dependent on the 
securities markets for funding and risk management. Liquidity problems in 
the securities markets could easily spread to the banking sector. Serious 
disturbances in the securities markets could severely affect the funding of a 
bank. Also, “sale of assets to cover funding needs may itself depress the 
value of other holdings, or be impossible due to the market-liquidity crisis”, 
with contagious effects for the entire banking sector.  If these banks run into 
problems, it may jeopardize the payment system with severe effects on the 
entire economy. Thus, the funding of and the risk management systems in 
banks have become so dependent on the securities markets that systemic 
risks may follow if liquidity falls. As banks are becoming increasingly active 
in securities business, including issuing, trading, underwriting and providing 
back-up facilities the potential problems are increasing. 
 
3.3 d)Insider trading 
Prohibiting insiders from trading when they have superior knowledge, and 
forcing them to disclose all their trades are measures aimed at reducing the 
asymmetric information and restoring market confidence among market 
participants and the general public. Here, it is not obvious that any market 
solution, such as signaling or reputation, would solve the problem. 
Therefore, potentially rules and regulations to reduce the asymmetric 
information may be welfare increasing, given that a well-functioning market 
can be seen as a public good. There are four means through which insider 
trading could potentially harm the company. First, insider trading may 
reduce the efficiency of corporate decisions by delaying the transmission of 
information within the company. However, if a manager wants to trade on 
price sensitive information before transmitting it to her superior – a phone 
call to her broker would suffice and this would not take more than a few 
minutes. Thus, the delay story is not convincing. Second, insider trading 
may increase the individual manager’s incentives to choose high-risk 
projects, where the benefits from insider trading are larger. However, this 
may attenuate the conflict that managers are more risk averse than 
shareholders. Third, managers may manipulate share prices, by disclosure 
policies etc, in order to maximize their insider trading profits and at 
considerable social costs. However, prohibiting insider trading is also costly. 
Fourth, insider trading may harm the company’s reputation. The main 
problem is that the insider information is the property of the corporation. 
Therefore the insider trading is primarily a contractual dilemma and could be 
resolved through contracts between the corporation and the user of any 
insider information. In practice, insider trading rules and regulations could 
entail establishing and verifying standards of information, supervising 
disclosure requirements and enforcing obligations to  include audit reports in 
the annual statements of companies, etc. 
 
3.3 e)Externalities 
There are also other externality problems. As more traders access a certain 
trading system, the benefits for everybody in the trading system will rise. 
Thus, there are clearly externalities involved in market liquidity. One 
problem with this externality is that it results in a consolidation of trading to 
a limited number of trading venues. These concentration tendencies are 
likely to limit competition. Thus, financial markets have a certain number of 
features in common with natural monopolies. From economic theory, we 
know that monopolies charge prices that are higher than the socially optimal. 
This results in a too low production of the services supplied by the 
monopolist and an economic loss to society and investors. Economic theory 
indicates that the ideal situation is perfect competition on all markets. The 
concentration tendencies described above may be seen as a market failure. 
Put differently, if we let the market forces work, the competition between 
the providers of the financial markets may be limited and the level of 
financial services production sub-optimal. The obvious regulatory response 
is to lower the barriers to entry, in order to stimulate competition. The 
question here is if the concentration tendencies are higher in the securities 
business than in other areas. There are surely also other industries with 
significant concentration tendencies. However there may be two reasons 
why securities markets are more exposed to this problem than other markets. 
Firstly, financial securities have very low transaction costs, such as 
transportation and legal costs. In many other markets, these costs make 
market integration prohibitively expensive. Therefore, concentrations 
tendencies in securities market may be large compared to other markets. 
Secondly, securities regulation imposed for other reasons – may raise the 
barriers-to-entry and reduce competition. The traditional test of “fit and 
proper” is one example of a regulation, which in this sense could be 
counterproductive in terms of efficiency. In defining securities regulations, – 
motivated for other reasons– it is therefore important to take the 
concentrations tendencies into account. Still, the main question is whether 
these concentrations tendencies necessitate regulation specific to the 
securities industry or whether the general anti-trust laws and competition 
regulations are sufficient. There are also other externalities. For example, all 
market participants would be better off if everybody followed high ethical 
standards, but market participants often have strong incentives to break these 
standards as long as everybody else acts ethically. The result without rules 
and regulation may be that many participants break the ethical rules and 
everybody is worse off. There is a market failure if the incentives of the 
market participants (be it exchanges, brokers, major investors, corporations 
etc) are not aligned. The problem is that they cannot coordinate their actions. 
This is a classical prisoner’s dilemma problem and can be generalized to 
many situations. Another example of a coordination dilemma is the 
monitoring problem, common to securities markets. The basic problem is the 
combination of three features. First, there is a principal agent problem. 
Investors – the principals – supply capital into corporations but delegate the 
decisions to the management – the agents. Small investors – the principals – 
buy investment services from professional investors – the agents. Second, 
contracts cannot specify all contingencies, and thus leave the agents with 
some freedom to deviate from what is optimal for the principals. Third in 
securities markets, the principals are typically small. Given these features, 
the competitive situation is likely to result in low levels of monitoring, due 
to free riding. Contracts that align the incentives of the agents and the 
principals could potentially be difficult to obtain. An aggregated low level of 
monitoring could therefore harm efficiency and appropriate regulation 
inducing coordination of the monitoring efforts could enhance efficiency. 
 
3.3 (f)The Consumer Protection Motive 
One frequently used argument for securities regulation and supervision is t                       
that the consumers need protection. Generally speaking, an efficient way to 
protect consumers in the securities markets is to ensure, a) that the price 
formation process is as efficient as possible, and b) that there is sufficient 
competition between the traders, brokers and other market participants. 
Thus, if a large number of professional traders compete in assembling and 
interpreting new information, securities market prices will reflect that 
information and unsophisticated traders do not need any additional 
information and analysis. In this case, the observed prices are sufficient. 
Given that rules and regulations are needed for some other reason, effective 
ways to protect uniformed traders are therefore to enact measures to reduce 
transaction costs, to guarantee efficient trading mechanisms, to introduce 
antitrust policies, to lower barriers to entry and to improve competition. If 
the markets are efficient, all trades will be performed at correct prices and 
the need to protect consumers will in principle vanish. Thus, one basic 
conclusion is that consumers are better protected in an efficient market than 
in a less efficient market. Thus, an effective way of protecting the consumers 
is to ensure an efficient market. However, securities markets cannot always 
be perfectly efficient in an informational sense. One of the reasons is that 
there is asymmetric information. The consumer protection argument for 
regulation is typically based on the existence of asymmetric information. 
Price sensitive information is not immediately spread to all traders. Some 
investors, especially small investors, normally have less access to 
information than other traders. As a consequence, securities regulations are 
often aimed at either reducing the asymmetric information between different 
agents, or limiting the perceived damage of asymmetric information. 
However, reducing the asymmetric information may also have significant 
adverse effects. If the regulation prohibits agents from taking advantage of 
superior information, this information will not be incorporated into the 
securities prices. It is exactly the search for information, not yet reflected in 
the prices, which makes prices informationally efficient. This search, which 
is costly, has to be profitable otherwise prices will not be as informative. 
Therefore, accepting a certain limited level of asymmetric information may 
be the price we have to pay to get informative prices on a well-functioning 
market. There are also other problems. The main reason for investor 
protection is based on a free-riding problem, combined with a principal 
agent conflict and incomplete contracts. Principal agent relationships are 
common in securities markets. Retail investors typically invest in different 
funds and other financial services firms. Here the former are principals and 
the latter agents. These investment funds, trusts and financial services firms 
invest in stocks, bond etc and then act as principals towards the management 
of the issuing companies (agents). Given that complete contracts are not 
feasible or enforceable, that all contingencies cannot be foreseen, and that it 
is not obvious that contracts that align the incentives are always available, 
there is a potential economic problem. Under these circumstances, the free 
market may yield a. socially sub-optimal solution, and thus there may be 
scope for regulations based on the consumer protection motive. socially sub-
optimal solution, and thus there may be scope for regulations based on the 
consumer protection motive. The overall conclusion is therefore that the 
main consumer protection argument for the regulation of investment services 
is based a) on the principal agent problem between the retail investor and the 
investment service provider, b) on the difficulty of the retail investor to 
monitor the performance of the service provider, even ex post, c) on the long 
term aspect of many investment services, and d) all under the assumption 
that the public se0ctor has a responsibility for some minimum living 
standards. Another question is then how these problems can be solved. Other 
Motives Occasionally other motives for separate securities regulations are 
presented, such as competitiveness and money laundering. Historically, a 
number of other politically motivated arguments have been made, including 
the need to channel funds to politically favored sectors of the economy, or to 
help financing public deficits. However after the deregulation of securities 
markets, the latter argument have more or less disappeared. 
   
 3.3 (g)Money Laundering 
With the exploding volume of international financial transactions and the 
lifted regulation on these transactions, it has become easier also for drug 
traders and organized crime to use the financial system to hide criminal 
revenue and transform them into legitimate financial positions. Therefore a 
number of countries have imposed reporting requirements for major 
currency transactions. As long as it is only a question of requirements to 
report, the costs are likely to be small and not to influence legitimate 
transactions in any major way. However, if additional restrictions are 
imposed, even for ‘good’ causes such as in the combat against terrorism, It 
may severely affect the efficiency of international securities markets. Money 
mobilized in security markets by monopoly brokers  used for their own 
personal benefit(luxuries) is also considered as money laundering. 
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4 Corporate Governance(defined) 
Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments21 
.Most advanced market economies attempted to solve the problem of 
corporate governance to the extent that they have assured the flows of 
enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the 
providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the 
corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance 
mechanisms cannot be improved. Corporate governance mechanisms are 
economic and legal mechanisms that can be altered through the political 
process. Corporate governance is a straightforward agency perspective 
sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control.   
 
4.1Corporate Governance in Finance 
Corporate governance influences the efficiency of  firm production at the 
corporate level, so that the effectiveness of a nation’s corporate governance 
system shapes economic performance at a country level22. Standard agency 
theory defines the corporate governance problem in terms how equity and 
debt holders influence managers to act in the best interests of the providers 
of capital. To the extent that shareholders and creditors induce managers to 
maximize firm value, this will improve the efficiency with which firms 
allocate resources. These mechanisms, however, do not work well around 
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the world. Small investors have a difficult time exercising corporate 
governance because of informational asymmetries and poor legal, 
bankruptcy, and regulatory systems. If the world is to rely on banks – and 
other financial intermediaries – to exert effective corporate governance, then 
the managers of financial institutions must themselves face sound corporate 
governance. If bank managers face sound incentives, they will be more 
likely to allocate capital efficiently and then implement effective corporate 
governance over the firms in which they invest. If bank managers, however, 
have enormous  
discretion to act in their own interests rather than the interests of the bank’s 
equity and debt holders, then this will adversely affect corporate governance. 
In particular, banks will allocate capital less efficiently and bank managers 
may actually induce firm managers to behave in ways that favor the interests 
of bank managers and firms but hurt overall firm performance. Thus, the 
corporate governance of banks and other financial intermediaries is crucial 
for shaping capital allocation at the firm level and at the country level. 
Nevertheless, the financial sector has generally received far less attention in 
the corporate governance literature than seems warranted by their central 
role in a nation’s corporate governance system. How do the suppliers of 
capital influence managers to act in the best interests of capitalists? 
First, governments construct the basic legal system underpinning corporate 
governance. Second, governments may influence the flow of corporate 
finance by restricting corporate activities and insuring corporate finance in 
the case of banks and occasionally other intermediaries.    We consider each 
of these stakeholders and also discuss the market for corporate control.  
 
 
4.2 Problems of Corporate Governance in Finance 
In particular, we examine three interrelated characteristics of financial 
intermediaries and how these traits affect corporate governance. First, banks 
and other intermediaries are more opaque, which fundamentally intensifies 
the agency problem. Due to greater information asymmetries between 
insiders and outside investors in banking, it is (i) more difficult for equity 
and debt holders to monitor managers and use incentive contracts, (ii) easier 
for managers and large investors to exploit the private benefits of control, 
rather than maximize value, (iii) unlikely that potential outside bidders with 
poor information will generate a sufficiently effective takeover threat to 
improve governance substantially, and (iv) likely that a more monopolistic 
sector will ensue and will generate less corporate governance through 
product market competition, compared with an industry with less 
informational asymmetries. Second, banks, like most intermediaries, are 
heavily regulated and this frequently impedes natural corporate governance 
mechanisms. For instance, (i) deposit insurance reduces monitoring by 
insured depositors, reduces the desirability of banks to raise capital from 
large, uninsured creditors with incentives to monitor, and increases 
incentives for shifting bank assets to more risky investments, (ii) regulatory 
restrictions on the concentration of ownership interfere with one of the main 
mechanisms for exerting corporate governance around the world: 
concentrated ownership, (iii) regulatory restrictions on entry, takeovers, and 
bank activities reduce competition, which reduce market pressures on 
managers to maximize profits, and (iv) bank regulators and supervisors 
frequently have their own incentives in influencing bank managers that do 
not coincide with value maximization. Finally, government ownership of 
banks fundamentally alters the corporate governance equation. Since state 
ownership of banks remains large in many countries, this makes corporate 
governance of the banking industry very different from other industries. 
 
4.3 Strategy for improving Corporate Governance 
23Existing research shows that countries in which the government supports 
the ability of private sector entities to monitor banks, permits banks to 
engage in a wide-range of activities, in banking. As a first step, it is critical 
that governments recognize and curb any of their own behaviors that thwarts 
the private sector’s ability and incentive to monitor banks. Thus, for 
example, in countries in which government ownership is pronounced, 
private sector monitoring cannot be expected, and competitive forces clearly 
are blocked. Moreover, as argued above, government supervision of 
government banks also cannot be expected to be thorough and independent 
as we observe in India. In these cases, embarking on a program to reduce 
government ownership where it is pronounced would seem to be essential; 
without this step it is difficult to conceive of the success of other efforts to 
ameliorate the governance problem. Countries with blanket deposit 
insurance, or extremely generous deposit insurance coverage (certainly the 
levels of 10 to 15 times per capita GDP that are found in very low income 
countries) also are sure to be those in which private sector monitoring is 
virtually nonexistent. Reducing such coverage to much lower levels also 
would be essential in order to enhance private sector monitoring. A second 
step in improving governance in banking involves directly reducing the 
opacity of banks by improving the flow of information. Although 
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transparency of banking information in emerging markets is receiving 
increased attention in the wake of the East Asian crisis (and perhaps more so 
in the aftermath of the Enron collapse), the likely reinforcement of opacity 
by existing ownership patterns in emerging markets suggests that this task is 
even more important and yet more difficult than has been recognized. In 
effect, authorities will need to engage in the unpopular task of shaking-up 
cozy relationships among powerful interest groups in their society. This task 
is not as simple as superficial adherence to international standards; rather, it 
is a process that will require sustained commitment over a period of time in 
order to effect. In addition to much greater attention to improving 
accounting and auditing, improvements to credit information will facilitate 
the expansion of banking by those interested in providing finance to groups 
that were previously excluded. Enhancing corporate finance reporting in the 
media, and education as to the importance of this issue in a wide swath of 
civil society, will help make a lasting contribution to better corporate 
governance. This is not easy: the same family groups that control banks may 
also control the media, so broader antitrust activity may be necessary in 
order to make this work. Moreover, it is worth stressing again that these 
changes will not happen to the extent that governments underwrite risk. 
Third, although better information may indirectly enhance the contestability 
of the banking market and invigorate the market for corporate control in 
banking, opening to foreign banks offers a direct mechanism for creating 
competitive pressures in banking. It was not so much the presence of foreign 
banks as the contestability of markets (associated with relative openness to 
foreign entry) that contributed to the development and stability of emerging 
market banking. Foreign banks, and indeed foreign entry in other markets, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
will serve to increase the competitiveness of the economy in general and 
lessen the reliance on family or conglomerates relationships. Increased 
foreign presence in emerging market banking has the attractive benefit of 
improving access to credit, even by small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
resulting increase in competition in the economy can pay dividends in the 
long-term to the corporate governance problems discussed here. Clearly the 
same should apply to foreign competition in insurance and pension 
management. Fourth and most importantly, the potential monitors of banks – 
owners, markets (large creditors in particular) and supervisors – need clear 
and strong incentives to do their jobs well. As stressed above, the legal and 
bankruptcy systems do not operate well in many countries. Thus, bank 
managers can control banks with little to fear from outsider investors, or 
even from bankruptcy as is clearly evident from Japan’s ten-year banking 
crisis. Owners, particularly controlling shareholders, will have the incentive 
to monitor their banks well (meaning in accordance with society’s goals), 
only to the extent that their own resources are really at risk and to the extent 
that there are healthy profits in return for safe and sound banking. 
Unfortunately, ensuring that capital is real and that weak lending practices 
have not eroded is not simple in practice. The incentives facing insider 
owners and managers can be enhanced in a number of ways. The ability of 
authorities to influence inside owners and managers is enhanced if regulators 
can impose penalties when there is evidence of fraud or of improper 
conduct. Similarly, the incentives of inside owners and managers will clearly 
be enhanced if small shareholders and debtors can confidently use an 
efficient court system that supports their rights.More generally, regulation 
has not focused much attention on the compensation of senior managers. For 
example, an attempt to vary capital requirements in line with the extent to 
which banks’ compensation policies encourage or discourage excessive risk 
taking is a promising area for new research. The supervisory process in some 
countries is getting close to this issue when supervisors examine the systems 
that banks have in place for managing their risks. We suspect that as 
important as risk management is as a process, the incentives inside the 
individual banks for taking risk will determine the efficacy of any processes 
that are written down. Certainly, the threat of legal recourse for those who 
suffer losses when directors do not fulfill their fiduciary duties would 
improve the incentives for this group, and it might also encourage them to 
support reforms in compensation policies for senior bank officers. 
Compensation policies of directors themselves also demand greater attention 
and further research  into the extent to which bank and corporate 
performance is a function of differences in this area would be highly useful. 
To improve corporate governance of financial intermediaries, policy makers 
must seek to enhance the ability and incentives of creditors and other market 
participants to monitor banks. Recently, subordinated debt proposals have 
received increased attention. It should be clear that the governance problem 
in finance is severe, but it is not hopeless. Recognition of the difficulty of 
the process, and the need to get governments focused on. Better-governed 
banks, in the sense of those able to contribute to development yet also robust 
to macro disturbances, used to be more common. Notwithstanding, waves of 
failure by small U.S. banks in the nineteenth century, depositor losses in the 
now industrialized countries were minor and taxpayers’ losses nil. This state 
of affairs resulted from clear incentives for the various actors reviewed here, 
not least of which was the practice for bonds to be posted by bankers and 
even deferred compensation for supervisors. We can only hope that the scale 
of losses in emerging market banking and the consequent increased attention 
to this topic will help promote reform efforts. 
 
4.4 Corporate Governance in India 
24In India recently ,March 2003, a committee has been formed by SEBI to 
discuss the scope of Corporate Governance in India which is headed by 
the CEO of Infosys,Narayana Murthy. 
Excerpts from the Committee report: 
A corporation is a congregation of various stakeholders, namely, customers, 
employees, investors, vendor partners, government and society. A 
corporation should be fair and transparent to its stakeholders in all its 
transactions. This has become imperative in today’s globalized business 
world where corporations need to access global pools of capital, need to 
attract and retain the best human capital from various parts of the world, 
need to partner with vendors on mega collaborations and need to live in 
harmony with the community. Unless a corporation embraces and 
demonstrates ethical conduct, it will not be able to succeed. 
Corporate governance is about ethical conduct in business. Ethics is 
concerned with the code of values and principles that enables a person to 
choose between right and wrong, and therefore, select from alternative 
courses of action. Further, ethical dilemmas arise from conflicting interests 
of the parties involved. In this regard, managers make decisions based on a 
set of principles influenced by the values, context and culture of the 
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organization. Ethical leadership is good for business as the organization is 
seen to conduct its business in line with the expectations of all stakeholders.  
Corporate governance is beyond the realm of law. It stems from the culture 
and mindset of management, and cannot be regulated by legislation alone. 
Corporate governance deals with conducting the affairs of a company such 
that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the 
greatest number of stakeholders. It is about openness, integrity and 
accountability. What legislation can and should do is to lay down a common 
framework – the “form” to ensure standards. The “substance” will ultimately 
determine the credibility and integrity of the process. Substance is 
inexorably linked to the mindset and ethical standards of management 
Corporations need to recognize that their growth requires the cooperation of 
all the stakeholders; and such cooperation is enhanced by the corporation 
adhering to the best corporate governance practices. In this regard, the 
management needs to act as trustees of the shareholders at large and prevent 
asymmetry of benefits between various sections of shareholders, especially 
between the owner-managers and the rest of the shareholders. 
Corporate governance is a key element in improving the economic 
efficiency of a firm. Good corporate governance also helps ensure that 
corporations take into account the interests of a wide range of constituencies, 
as well as of the communities within which they operate. Further, it ensures 
that their Boards are accountable to the shareholders. This, in turn, helps 
assure that corporations operate for the benefit of society as a whole. While 
large profits can be made taking advantage of the asymmetry between 
stakeholders in the short run, balancing the interests of all stakeholders alone 
will ensure survival and growth in the long run. This includes, for instance, 
taking into account societal concerns about labor and the environment. 
Often, increased attention on corporate governance is a result of financial 
crisis. For instance, the Asian financial crisis brought the subject of 
corporate governance to the surface in Asia. Further, recent scandals 
disturbed the otherwise placid and complacent corporate landscape in the 
US. These scandals, in a sense, proved to be serendipitous. They spawned a 
new set of initiatives in corporate governance in the US and triggered fresh 
debate in the European Union as well as in Asia. The many instances of 
corporate misdemeanours have also shifted the emphasis on compliance with 
substance, rather than form, and brought to sharper focus the need for 
intellectual honesty and integrity. This is because financial and non-financial 
disclosures made by any firm are only as good and honest as the people 
behind them. By this very principle, only those industrialists whose 
corporations are governed properly should be allowed to be a part of 
committees. This includes the Prime Minister and Finance Minister’s 
advisory councils, committees set up by the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (“CII”), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”), the 
Department of Company Affairs, ministries, and the boards of large banks 
and financial institutions. 
 







5 Conclusion 
Findings and Recommendations  
The security scams and financial scandals discussed here involved the 
manipulation of huge amounts of money. The purpose of the so called 
“traders”  or “investors” was not genuine. The perpetrators had such a 
comprehensive knowledge of how the system worked that they manipulated 
it. It is clearly evident that the occurrence and reoccurrence of such security 
scams and financial scandals as some point in time be attributed to a failure 
of corporate governance in finance and that of financial regulation. 
Corporate Governance vs Financial Regulation is more a personal thing 
which involves the adherence to rules regulations and ethics by officials 
(management).It is more self enforced as a ethical behavior or a matter of 
pursuing codes of conduct without an outside agent monitoring , but 
financial market regulation in exercised more by an external organization 
either a regulatory body authorized to monitor and impose  a surveillance 
mechanism  to ensure frauds or misdemeanors are not perpetuated and so 
that the market functions efficiently to over see the functions of the market 
participants and impose fines and other penalty for non-compliance. 
25Though standard corporate governance theory states that corporate 
governance includes the role that equity and debt holders have to play in 
influencing managers to act in the best interests of suppliers of capital it 
should not be forgotten that it also includes the role that creditors, owners 
and government in the same capacity. While corporate governance 
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mechanisms are decided by economic and legal institutions and are 
influenced by politics it's success depends a great deal on the principles, 
diligence and sincerity of management when it comes to the adherence to 
rules and regulation. Also they must have a concern for the welfare of 
shareholders(investors) and other suppliers of capital to ensure that they get 
a fair and regular return for their investments. While corporate governance 
ensures a regular supply of capital and fair share of profit to investors it's 
role does not end there. Corporate Governance at that level does not mean 
that it is entirely solved but definitely can be improved on. Shareholders and 
other parties find difficulty in exercising corporate governance because of 
poor legal systems, corruption and bankruptcy. Also managers have the 
incentive to act in their own interests rather than the interests of equity and 
debt holders which could definitely affect corporate governance. Also 
informational asymmetries in the system make it difficult for equity and debt 
holders to monitor mangers. It also induces bank mangers to act according to 
their own incentives and not according to value maximization. Also heavy 
regulation induces bankers to invest in high risk ventures rather than 
borrowing from uninsured borrowers who have a greater incentive monitor 
.Also regulations and prohibitions of entry of foreign banks reduces 
competition and market pressures on managers to earn profits. Corporate 
Governance problem can be improved by increasing private monitoring and 
reducing government ownership when it interferes with private monitoring. 
The opacity of banking processes should be removed and a proper 
information flow should ensue. A lack of this can be attributed to the Asian 
Crisis and collapse of Enron. Entry of foreign banks should induce 
competition and make mangers do their job well without relying on family 
conglomerates and politicians. Also managers in banks should be given 
strong incentives to do their jobs well and their good efforts should be 
rewarded and mistakes corrected. They should be remunerated well. In India 
corporate governance revolves around ethical behavior on part of 
management, knowing to make right decisions and also knowing to choose 
between right and wrong.. It also calls for the managers to behave in the 
interests of economics efficiency of the firm and shareholders. Management 
should be made more accountable for their actions in terms of deployment of 
funds , making decisions and also transmitting information. However though 
standard corporate governance theory states that it's realms of control 
include assuring a fair return to suppliers of capital it's scope has changed in 
recent years. Often, increased attention on corporate governance is a result 
of financial crisis. For instance, the Asian financial crisis brought the subject 
of corporate governance to the surface in Asia. Further, recent scandals 
disturbed the otherwise placid and complacent corporate landscape in the 
26US. These scandals, in a sense, proved to be serendipitous. They spawned 
a new set of initiatives in corporate governance in the US and triggered fresh 
debate in the European Union as well as in Asia. 27One cannot forget the 
security scams in India. The many instances of corporate misdemeanors 
have also shifted the emphasis on compliance with substance, rather than 
form, and brought to sharper focus the need for intellectual honesty and 
integrity. This is because financial and non-financial disclosures made by 
any firm are only as good and honest as the people behind them. By this 
very principle, only those industrialists whose corporations are governed 
properly should be allowed to be a part of committees. 28This includes the 
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Prime Minister and Finance Minister’s advisory councils, committees set up 
by the Confederation of Indian Industry (“CII”), the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (“SEBI”), the Department of Company Affairs, ministries, 
and the boards of large banks and financial institutions  
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7 Glossary 
 
Bank Receipt :Bank Receipts are issued by the selling bank, signifying that 
it has received money and is holding the securities in trust for the buyer. 
Bank Receipts are supposed to be non-transferable and to be discharged after 
the securities are delivered. 
 
Public Debt Office(PDO)-In ledgers earmarked for each bank , the PDO of 
RBI records transactions between banks in government securities .Each kind 
of security transaction is recorded separately. 
 
Subsidiary General Ledger (SGL)-The Subsidiary General Ledger 
maintained by the PDO in which government security transactions are 
recorded. The SGL will show balance standing in the name of a particular 
bank in a particular security. 
 
Ready forward Deal-Known worldwide as repurchase options or repos. 
The Reserve Bank Of India's records refer to it as buyback .It involves 
selling securities with the purpose of buying them back after a short period 
of time, usually at a slightly higher price. The seller thereby creates 
temporary liquidity for himself for which he pays the higher price. 
 
Double Ready Forward-Simultaneous buying and selling of two sets of 
securities with the buyback options created  by both the parties. The seller's 
objective could be to create liquidity by selling one kind of 
security(normally ready forward)and at the same time buying some other 
kind for the portfolio. 
 
Special Purpose Entities(SPEs)-A business interest formed solely in order 
to accomplish some specific task or tasks. A business may utilize a special 
purpose entity for accounting purposes, but these transactions must still 
adhere to certain regulations.
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8) Appendix 
A)Stock Market Scam in India of 1991:The Janakiraman Committee 
Report 
On the basis of the information received that some banks -National Housing 
Bank(NHB),State Bank Of Saurashtra,SBI Capital Markets Ltd (SBI 
Caps),Standard Chartered Bank,Canfina etc -were undertaking large-scale 
transactions in Government securities through the medium of brokers in the 
course of which they were violating the Reserve  Bank Of India (RBI’s) 
detailed guidelines issued to them in July 1991,RBI had started making 
enquiries into the securities transactions of some of the banks since January 
1992.Towards the end of March 1992 ,information was also received that 
State Bank Of India (SBI) had purchased a large quantity of Government 
securities on a ready forward basis one day prior to the date on which the 
coupon rate of Govt of India securities was raised. Therefore the securities 
transactions of SBI were also taken up for scrutiny immediately.The bank 
was advised on 2 April 1992 to furnish to RBI a statement of as on 31 March 
1992 as soon as the statement was compiled. It was observed that the bank 
was unable to furnish the statement as it had not reconciled the balance of 
securities held by it as shown with the actual balance held in the 29Subsidary 
General Ledger (SGL) Account with the RBI beyond November 1991. 
                     
(1)The following banks, subsidiaries of banks and institutions have made 
payments for purchase of investments for which they do not hold either 
securities, SGL forms or BRs to the extent indicated below: 
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Table 4: Payments for purchase of investments for which Subsidiary 
General Ledgers and Bank Receipts are not held during security scam 
1991 in India 
Name of Bank                 Rs in crores 
National Housing 
Bank(NHB) 
1199.39 
 
State Bank Of 
Saurashtra 
175.04 
 
SBI Capital Markets 
Ltd(SBI Caps) 
121.23 
Standard Chartered 
Bank 
300.00 
 
Total 1795.66 
      
 
 
(2)Banks ,subsidiaries of banks and institutions are holding BRs/SGLs 
issued by the Bank Of Karad Ltd and the Metropolitan Co-operative Bank 
for which the issuing banks do not appear  to have sufficient backing to the 
extent indicated below: 
 
Table 5:Banks,subsidiaries of banks and institutions holding Bank 
Recipts and Subsidiary General Ledgers for which there appears to be 
no sufficient backing during security scam of 1991 in India 
                                                     
Name Of Bank 
Rs in crores 
Standard Chartered Bank 755.00 
Canbank Financial Services 
Ltd(Canfina) 
425.00 
 
Canbank Mutual Fund 102.97 
Total 1282.97 
 
A1) Recommendations  
Based on the committee’s preliminary findings it made the following 
recommendations 
(1)The diversion of funds has been largely facilitated by the practice of 
banks executing a large number of “ready forward” and “double ready 
forward” transactions . Since there is no permanent sale of transfer of 
investments in such cases ,there is no real need to effect transfer of actual 
scrips of SGL forms or to deposit SGL forms when issued with the 
30PDO(Public Debt Office-that which records all the banks transactions in 
government securities). These transactions have, therefore, presumably been 
supported by BRs or SGL(ledger accounts maintained by the PDO which 
records all the banks transactions in government securities with 
balances)forms not intended to be deposited with the PDO.As the 
transactions effectively get reversed on the due date, it is also possible that 
the transactions were effected without the sale of BRs ,SGL forms by the 
issue of unauthorized BRs or SGL forms. A “ready forward” transaction in 
substance could also be a mere lending of funds for the period  of the 
contract in the guise of a purchase/sale of investments. The Committee 
recommended that- 
(a) the practice of banks entering in to ”ready forward” and “double ready 
forward” deals with other banks be restricted to Government 
securities only (as permitted by the RBI) and guidelines be laid down 
specifying the circumstances in which such transactions would be 
permitted. 
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(b) Banks be prohibited from entering into “ready forward” and “double           
ready forward” deals in other securities including PSU bonds , units 
and shares; 
(c) The prohibition regarding banks entering into “buy back” deals with 
non-bank clients (already imposed by the RBI) be strictly enforced 
and action be taken against banks which have violated this direction; 
(d) Banks be prohibited from entering into “ready forward” and “double 
ready forward” deals on behalf of customers under portfolio 
management scheme (PMS). 
2)The internal control procedures of banks regarding their treasury 
functions be immediately reviewed by the RBI,inter alia,with regard to- 
(a)the segregation of duties between  
(a1) persons responsible for entering into deals 
      (a2)persons having custody of investments and  
      (a3) persons responsible for recording the transactions in the books of 
accounts and other records 
       (b)the periodic reconciliation of investment account and the independent 
verification thereof;       
       (c) controls over the issue of SGL forms and BRs and record keeping in 
respect thereof; 
       (d) controls for verification of the authenticity of BRs and SGL forms 
and confirmation of authorized signatures; 
        (e)procedures for confirmation with counterparties of brokers’ contracts 
as also of overdue BRs; 
         (f)the segregation of responsibilities of persons handling the bank’s 
own investment and those deleing on client’s accounts. 
         (3) Banks should be required to formulate and get approved internal 
exposure limits which ensure that there is no undue reliance on a few 
brokers. These limits should also cover the maximum amount of outstanding 
BRs or SGLs issued by other banks which can be accepted by the bank. 
         (4)Brokers’ contract notes should be required to indicate the 
counterparty so that direct communication with such parties is possible.The 
notes should also indicate separately the brokerage charged on the 
transactions. 
         (5)When banks act as custodian of brokers’ or other parties’ securities 
,all transactions effected for such customers (including all 
documentation)must clearly disclose that the bank is acting as a custodian 
and not as a principal. 
        (6)The existing prohibition on banks issuing cheques drawn on their 
account with the RBI for third party transactions should be strictly enforced. 
Such payments should be made through normal instruments like bankers’ 
cheques, drafts or a transfer advice which clearly discloses the identity of the 
person on whose behalf the transfer is made. 
         (7)When banks exercise custodial functions on behalf of their 
merchant banking subsidiaries these functions should be subject to the same 
procedures and safeguards as would be applicable to other constituents. 
Therefore, full details should be available with the subsidiaries of the 
manner in which the transactions have been executed. 
          (8) the issuance of a large number of BRs in respect of transactions in 
PSU bonds may have been justified by the banks on the ground that there 
has been undue delay in the issue of scrips by the PSUs and therefore trading 
in such bonds has been possible only through BRs. The issue of a large 
number of BRs in respect of units may also have been justified by the banks 
on the ground that the transfer of the units in the name of the  buyer involves 
stamp duty and therefore transfers need to be effected only when the units 
need to be lodged with the UTI payment of dividend. These are no doubt 
valid assertions but the practice of issuance of BRs in respect of these 
instruments have been largely responsible for the diversion of funds to the 
brokers; 
         (9)The issuance of BRs in respect of Government securities as also the 
apparent short-trading has been sought to be justified by the banks on 
grounds of the inability of the PDOs in the RBI to record speedily the 
transactions effected and to communicate the credit advices in time to banks. 
Banks, therefore do not know the fate of SGL forms lodged when they in 
turn issue SGL forms. The Committee is not convinced that this justification 
is valid particularly since objection memos have generally been 
communicated in time. However ,the work of the PDOs needs to be 
considerably speeded up and more relevant information furnished to banks. 
This information should include; 
(a)  immediate advice of all objection memos. Unless a bank makes 
arrangements on  a regular basis to collect objection memos over the 
PDO counter the advices should be by courier for which 
acknowledgement would be debited to the account of the concerned 
bank; 
(b) a weekly statement of all transactions in individual ledger accounts 
together with the balance thereof. 
It is also necessary that there is a daily verification of all securities held in 
the SGL accounts of all banks in the aggregate and that on a weekly basis 
the PDO submit to the Department of Banking Operations and Development 
(DBOD) of the RBI a report giving bank-wise details of all SGLs returned 
for want of sufficient balance.The Committee believes that given the large 
number of accounts the large number of individual securities and the number 
of transactions, the work of the PDO cannot be done manually and needs to 
be immediately computerized. 
              (10)The Committee recognizes that with 80 banks having over 
60000 branches it is virtually impossible for the RBIs inspection 
procedures to examine individual transactions of banks. At present the 
RBI carries out an annual financial review(AFR) and a financial 
inspection once in four years. Even the financial inspection is largely 
concerned with the advances portfolio of the banks and the adequacy of 
provisions. The committee understands that the inspection system and 
procedures of the DBOD have been recently reviewed by a committee 
appointed by the RBI governor and its recommendations are in the 
process of being implemented. However the primary responsibility in this 
regard must remain with the bank managements which must remain with 
the bank managements which must ensure that there are adequate internal 
control (including internal audit) procedures. The committee would 
,therefore recommend that: 
(a) On-site inspection by the RBI should be supplemented by reporting of 
compliance by banks with prudential and other guidelines. To lend 
authenticity to this compliance reporting, banks should be required to 
get compliance in key areas certified by statutory auditors of the 
banks. 
(b) The scope of the RBI inspection should be widened to include greater 
emphasis on the treasury function 
(c) The RBI should review the adequacy of the internal audit departments 
of the banks and the scope of their operations. 
(d) The portfolio management operations of banks should be subjected to 
a separate audit by the banks’statutory auditors as these operations are 
in the nature of trusteeship functions. 
(e) The RBI should strengthen it’s organization responsible fro market 
intelligence so that early action can be taken when there are market 
rumours of irregularities. 
                11)Ready Purchase Operations 
It would be counter productive to ban REPO transactions as they serve a 
useful purpose as money market instrument for equilibrating liquidity and 
for covering the needs of banks and bulk investors for short-term funds at 
varying points of  time. While continuation of REPOs even in PSU bonds 
and units could be allowed. It is important that the transactions should be 
covered by prudential guidelines to be stipulated by RBI, limiting overall 
maximum position as also portfolio turn over ratios per player and 
stipulating that all transactions are put through a centralized clearance 
system, which can inter alia make the necessary information available to the 
authorities.Only banks, mutual funds and financial institutions may be 
allowed to participate in the REPO operations .These also would necessarily 
be the members of the centralized clearing agency. The need of some of the 
PSUs who have large stocks of existing PSU bonds also has to be recognized 
and they  should be allowed to participate in REPO transactions with 
banks/mutual funds/financial institutions for a limited period of say ,two 
years.RBI may look into the manner in which banks and financial 
institutions account in their books their investments in PSU bonds and units 
and ensure that these are valued at market prices rather than at prices 
nominated in REPO transactions. 
                12)Role of Brokers 
As regards role of brokers the committee recommends that the firms dealing 
in the money market transactions should be segregated from those dealing in 
shares. RBI would be the right authority to regulate such firms with regard 
to adequacy of their capital, extent f transactions etc. These brokers should 
be allowed to take positions, but they should cat as genuine intermediaries. 
                   13)Phased Electronic Clearance, Settlement and Depository 
(ECSD) 
  All the transactions should be routed through a centralized agency which 
will operate an electronic book-entry clearance and settlement system and 
would also act as depository (ECSD).RBI should ensure that all the bulk 
investors (i.e. banks, mutual funds ,financial institutions and PSUs ) become 
members of the ECSD and all their transactions in PSU/units irrespective of 
whether they are traded on stock exchanges or outside on spot basis are 
reported cleared and settled through ECSD.There be only one ECSD in 
Bombay/New Bombay as the setting up to many smaller organizations may 
not be cost effective and may create problems in monitoring and control.To 
give a legal standing to the depository legal changes would also be required 
for registration of PSU bonds and units in the name of the depository .Legal 
changes will also be required for exemption of revenue stamp duty in respect 
of PSU bonds/units whilst registering in the name of the depository.ECSD 
should be formed and become operative straightaway even in a limited 
fashion so that it can act as a centralized agency fro monitoring the 
transactions and making the data available for monetary and regulatory 
authorities. 
B) Security Market Scam of 2001:Joint Parliamentary Committee  
(JPC) Report 
The terms of reference of the Committee were as follows:— 
1. To go into the irregularities and manipulations in all their ramifications in 
all transactions, 
including insiders trading, relating to shares and other financial instruments 
and the 
role of banks, brokers and promoters, stock exchanges, financial institutions, 
corporate 
entities and regulatory authorities. 
2. To fix the responsibility of the persons, institutions or authorities in 
respect of such 
transactions. 
3. To identify the misuse, if any, of and failures/inadequacies in the control 
and the 
supervisory mechanisms. 
4. To make recommendations for safeguards and improvements in the 
system to prevent 
rec urrence of such failures. 
5. To suggest measures to protect small investors. 
6. To suggest deterrent measures against those found guilty of violating the 
regulations. 
B1) Overview 
  
Parliament, through a motion in the Lok Sabha on 26.4.2001, mandated this 
JPC(Joint Parliamentary Committee) to enquire into the stock market scam. 
This scam was distinct and different from the scam enquired into by a Joint 
Parliamentary Committee in 1992-93. While the enquiry into the earlier 
scam related to ‘irregularities in securities and banking transactions’, the 
present scam mainly relates to financial misconduct in the stock market. 
Both the scam enquired into in 1992-93 and the present one have some 
common features like the failure of some banks as also high volatility in the 
stock market.The Committee were given an additional task after they had 
been constituted and started functioning. As announced by the Speaker, Lok 
Sabha on 3.8.2001, the Committee were further asked to look into all matters 
relating to the Unit Trust of India (UTI). This additional task to the 
Committee was necessitated by the freeze on resale of US-64 units by UTI 
in July 2001. Accordingly, the Committee enlarged their enquiry to include 
UTI in addition to the Stock Market Scam.During the working of this 
Committee, simultaneous actions pertaining to the enquiry were initiated by 
the Regulatory agencies like SEBI(Securities And Exchange Board Of 
India),RBI(Reserve Bank Of India) and DCA (Department Of Company 
Affairs).Information was gathered by the Committee from all these agencies 
through written questions, perusal of relevant departmental documents 
including files and depositions in person by heads/representatives of Banks, 
Regulatory bodies, Stock Exchanges, UTI(Unit Trust Of India) and officials 
of Government departments. The Committee were also assisted by the 
present Finance Minister and his three immediate predecessors. Flowing 
from the terms of reference were some of the questions that were discussed 
in-house by the JPC: Why do scams occur frequently? Are the rules and 
regulations obsolete or inadequate? Do regulatory authorities lack adequate 
power, or, are they deficient in implementation and vigilance? Do the stock 
exchanges follow laid-down guidelines and procedures? Are the managem 
ents of banks following the norms of accountability and corporate 
governance and are they running them according to guidelines laid down by 
the regulator? Should the stock market be self-disciplined and self-regulating 
or, should the regulators and the Government keep a close watch all the 
time? Have Government shown themselves alert to emerging problems?  
 
B2) The Mechanics of the Stock Market Scam of 2001 
 
The period of the scam, the main players involved, and its intensity have 
been examined by the Committee. The present scam includes the role of 
banks, stock exchanges, brokers, the Unit Trust of India (UTI), corporate 
bodies and chartered accountants. Regulatory authorities like SEBI, RBI and 
the Department of Company Affairs (DCA) should have been able to lay 
down and implement guidelines and procedures that could prevent such a 
scam or at least activate red alerts that could lead to early detection, 
investigation and action against fraud as well as the rectification of any 
systemic deficiencies discovered. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Regulators and all others concerned had the benefit of the voluminous and 
detailed Action Taken Reports (ATRs) submitted by Government to 
Parliament on the numerous recommendations of the 1993 Report of the 
Joint Committee on irregularities in securities and banking transactions. 
Concerted mutual interaction between Government and the Regulators, 
especially through the institutional mechanism of HLCC, could have 
signally contributed to effective pre-emptive and corrective action to 
forestall or moderate the scam by the early detection of wrong-doing. 
Investigations were undertaken by SEBI against  the manipulator’s  entities 
in the wake of allegations that manipulator’s entities were involved in 
market manipulation in some scrips. The manipulator was operating through 
a large number of entities which facilitated hiding the nexus between the 
source of fund flows to him from corporate houses, banks, financial 
institutions and foreign institutional investors and the ultimatedeployment of 
these funds in the stock market. It was observed that funds received by 
certain entities from banks as loans and overdrafts were diverted to other 
entities for acquiring shares/meeting other obligations. It also appeared that, 
transactions for purchase and sale of shares were done in the name of a large 
number of entities so that concentration of positions/transactions in a 
particular scrip could not be readily detected. Thus, various layers were 
created so that it became difficult to link the source of fund with the actual 
users to which these fund were put. He used a net working of various FII sub 
accounts, OCBs, institutions and mutual funds for large transactions thereby 
creating an impression of market interest in certain select scrips.To begin 
with, he normally identified companies with relatively low floating 
stocks,acquired substantial holdings in these companies either directly or 
through associates including FII sub accounts, OCBs etc.He also used the 
presence of a number of exchanges and different settlement cyclesto 
systemically shift positions from one Exchange to the other Exchange. 
While being interested in increasing or maintaining the prices of select 
scrips, he appears at various point of time to have systematically sold/off- 
loaded his holdings to book profits and take further positions therefrom to 
further increase the prices.. Some of the corporate groups which had given 
funds to the manipulators entities during January 2000-April 2001 are 
Adani, HFCL, DSQ, Cadila, Essel,Kopran and Nirma and the amount 
outstanding from the manipulator to these entities is over Rs. 1273 crore. His 
entities received around Rs. 80 crore from Vidyut Investments, a subsidiary 
of Ranbaxy. Most of the companies have claimed that the funds given by 
them to  the manipulator’s entities were in the nature of Inter Corporate 
Deposits(ICDs) under the Companies Act. They also claim that they have 
given some money to buy the shares of other companies but not their own. 
(i) Shares of DSQ Biotech, DSQ Industries were given by entities associated 
with promoters to the manipulator’s  entities who sold these shares through 
CSFB and Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (DKB) and availed of immediate 
funding. (ii) Shares of HFCL were reportedly given by promoter group  
entities to the manipulators entities for selling to strategic investors. Against 
the sanctioned limit of Rs. 205 crore, there is an outstanding balance ofRs. 
888.25 crore against the manipulators company Group towards Madhavpura 
MercantileCo-operative Bank (MMCB). As, against a limit of Rs. 92 crore, 
an amount of Rs. 225.63 crore is outstanding to MMCB from the Mukesh 
Babu Group. Shri Mukesh Babu has stated under oath that Rs. 57 crores was 
used for entities connected with the manipulators and Rs. 115 crores has 
been utilized for transactions made for Madhur Shares which is controlled 
by a son of Mr. Ramesh Parekh, Chairman of MMCB. There are close knit 
relations between the manipulator and Madhur Shares. Large funds have 
flowed from the manipulators account to the Madhur Shares account. It is 
suspected that dealings for Madhur Shares as well as through Manniar are 
for the manipulators entities mainly. The amount outstanding to Global Trust 
Bank from the manipulator’s entities as on 23.03.01 was Rs. 266.87 crore. 
The manipulator’s Company Group had also received funds from Centurion 
Bank, ICICI Bank and Bank of Punjab against which a total amount of Rs. 
65.47 crore was outstanding. MMCB issued Pay Orders (POs) in favour of 
the manipulators entities from time to time even when there were no 
sufficient credits/securities to cover these loans/over drafts.The 
manipulator’s entities would then discount these POs with Bank of India 
(BOI). The Stock Exchange Branch of BOI would present these Pay orders 
for realisation to the clearing house in the normal course of their business. 
On 8.2.2000 and 9.3.2001, MMCB issued Pay Orders totaling Rs. 137 crore 
in favour of the manipulator’s entities, which were immediately discounted 
with BOI and the proceeds received were utilized by the manipulator’s 
entities. But on this occasion when BOI presented these Pay Orders to the 
clearing house for realisation , MMCB declared its inability to pay, since 
sufficient funds were not available with the bank. Hence, BOI was left with 
a debit balance of Rs. 137 crore against the three manipulator’s entities 
concerned—Classic Credit Ltd. Panther Fincap and Panther Investrade 
Ltd.Triumph Group did not provide delivery to its OCB clients on several 
occasions. European Investments Ltd. (EIL) had lodged a complaint with 
SEBI, National Stock Exchange (NSE) & RBI against Triumph International 
Finance India Ltd. (TIFIL) regarding dishonouring of three cheques issued 
to EIL by TIFIL totaling Rs. 70.71 crore toward sale proceeds. On many 
occasions Triumph Group did not make payment to its OCB clients for sale 
transactions made by them. The amount of non-payment by TIFIL to four 
OCBs viz. Brentfield, Kensington, Wakefield and Dossier for sales effected 
from December 2000 to March 2001 stood at Rs. 105.95 crore. The amount 
of non-payment from Triumph Securities Ltd. to Wakefield was Rs. 16.7 
crore. The Committee enquired whether he and his associated entities built 
large concentrated position in some select scrips like HFCL, Zee Tele, DSQ 
Software, Global Tele, etc. and whether these companies provided him large 
funds to jack up their prices. In reply, the witness conceded that they had 
large investments in these companies and said ‘We did build huge positions 
in the market in these companies, and probably because of that I suffered 
that losses that I suffered.’ He further said that , ‘none of the corporates has 
ever given us money to invest in their own shares or to buy their own shares. 
The moneys received from the corporates were for specific contracts - for 
purchase of shares in the companies that they were interested in, either 
which we were holding or to buy them from the market. Parts of the 
contracts were completed in time, part of the contracts are still pending 
because I got into problems. The moneys that have come from these 
corporates have come when the markets have, in fact, started going down 
drastically and when the valuations thought by them were right for investing 
in the companies they wanted. In the whole rise of 1999-2000, not a single 
corporate has ever given us any money to invest in the shares. Even during 
the down side also, there was no money fromany corporate given to us to 
buy their own shares or for jacking up the price. Referring to SEBI reports, 
the Committee pointed out that funds were available to the manipulator from 
HFCL Group, Zee group, Madhavpura Bank and OCBs, the witness said that 
‘all these monies have come in from the period of September, 2000 to March 
2001’ after the fall started. According to the manipulator, the biggest rise in 
the market was during the period 1999-2000 and that his borrowings during 
that period was in the region of Rs. 50 crore to 100 crore. On the other hand 
the money borrowed by him or his entities when the market started falling 
was around Rs. 1500 crore.payable by them to various institutions, banks, 
corporates, brokers, OCBs, etc. According  to SEBI,it appeared that the 
manipulators entities suffered loss in range of Rs. 3000 crores to Rs. 4000 
crore. 
 
 
 
 
The amount payable by the manipulator’s entities is stated to be as follows : 
 
Table 6:Amount payable by Ketan Parekh's Entities to banks and 
companies during security scam of 2001 in India 
 
Name of the entity 
Amount  (Rs. in crore) approx 
 
Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative bank 888.00 
HFCL 550.00 
 
Essel Group 450.00 
 
Adani Group 132.00 
DSQ Group 75.00 
 
Shonkh Technologies 37.00 
Kopran 28.00 
Global Trust Bank 267.00 
 
ICICI Bank/Centurion/Bank of Punjab, etc 66.00 
 
OCBS (delivery of shares not given and 
sale proceeds not paid) 
480.00 
 
Total 3323 
 
The Committee find that the manipulator was a key person involved in all 
dimensions of the stock market scam which surfaced in March 2001, as also 
in payments problem in the Calcutta Stock Exchange (CSE) and the crash of 
Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank (MMCB). He was operating 
through a large number of entities which facilitated hiding the nexus 
between source of funds flow and their ultimate use. Various layers were 
created in his transactions so that it became difficult to link the source of 
fund with the actual user of fund. SEBI’s investigations after the scam have 
revealed that the amount outstanding from the manipulators entities to 
certain corporate houses at the end of April, 2001 was over Rs. 1,273 crore. 
Dues of the manipulators entities to MMCB were around Rs. 888 crore and 
to Global Trust Bank over Rs. 266 crore. There were also dues to other 
entities. The funds received from corporate houses and banks have gone to 
three major broker groups in CSE and been utilized in capital market 
operations. The manipulators entities appear to have chosen CSE mainly to 
exploit the known weaknesses of the EXchange. They also used a 
networking of various Overseas Corporate Bodies, Foreign Institutional 
Investor sub-accounts and mutual funds for large transactions. Not till the 
MMCB crash occurred did the regulatory authorities even begin looking in 
the manipulators directions although this was being underlined in Parliament 
and the media. It is difficult to believe that the Stock Exchanges or SEBI 
were quite unaware of what was going on in the market when the 
manipulators entities were manipulating the market using their network. Nor 
did the High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC) or the SEBI seek a 
check on where the mnaipulator was getting his funds from or his methods 
of manipulating the market. This is all the more disturbing in the context of 
the previous JPC’s findings against the manipulator. The main regulator of 
Stock Exchanges, SEBI, has been in place since 1988 and has been working 
under an Act of Parliament since 1992 and should have been able to regulate 
the liberalized market more efficiently. The Committee found that SEBI has 
still a long way to go before becoming a mature and effective regulator. If 
SEBI had continued to improve its procedures, vigilance, enforcement and 
control mechanisms, it could have been more effective in a situation where 
the stock market became unusually volatile, leading to an unprecedented 
surge and subsequent depression in the capital markets. It was also clear that 
the capitalmarket in India is neither deep nor wide enough to moderate 
volatility and, therefore, a fewplayers could attempt to manipulate the stock 
markets. Clearly, the various regulatory authorities were not able to foresee 
the situation leading to the scam and prevent it. “Nor was adequate attention 
paid in government circles particularly the Ministry of Finance as the 
custodian of the financial health of the economy.Wrong doing by banks have 
also contributed significantly towards the scam although the number of 
banks involved in committing irregularities in comparison to the total 
number of banks functioning in our country is small. Notably, major banks 
were nationalized in 1969 but pursuant to economic liberalization, new 
private banks including foreign banks were allowed into banking sector. 
Public sector banks were in general not involved in the scam and have fared 
well but private sector banks need to be closely watched, especially in the 
area of risk management and stricter regulation. Cooperative banks have 
tended to ignore rules, procedures and risk management. This should set the 
RBI and the Government thinking. There is need to have more effective 
regulation in the banking sector as a whole with particular emphasis on 
cooperative banks.One of the major concerns of the Committee was to look 
at the trading practices and procedures adopted in the stock market. Stock 
Exchanges, brokers and regulators play a very important role in determining 
the transparency of procedures and practices in the stock markets. The 
Committee went into the functioning of these entities and generally found 
that the quality of governance and the practices followed in the stock 
exchanges were different from exchange to exchange, having evolved from 
different local economic, social and historical conditions. SEBI, as a 
regulator, had made some attempts at standardizing the practices in these 
exchanges and had also instituted arrangements whereby the happening in 
the stock exchanges would come to its notice. But, in practice, the system 
did not function efficiently or in a transparent manner. When stock markets 
were rising, there was general lack of concern to see that such a rise should 
be in consonance with the integrity of the market and not the consequence of 
manipulation or other malpractice. On the other hand, when the markets 
went into a steep fall, there was concern all over. Such dissonance in the 
approach to issues of regulation and good governance needs to be replaced 
with effective regulation which concentrates on market integrity and investor 
protection whether at any given point of time the market is buoyant or not. 
This Committee did not concern itself with either the rise or fall of the 
market but specifically with manipulations or irregularities that caused 
unusual rise and fall. The procedures, adherence to rules and the concern for 
common investor appear to have been quite loose in the CSE. The payment 
problem that surfaced in Calcutta Stock Exchange brought to light many ills 
of the institution. Worse, those ills such as unofficial badla could have been 
recognized and corrected well in time. The Committee discussed the period 
in which the present Scam surfaced, resulting ultimately in the crash of the 
stock market in March 2001 onwards. During the year 1999 and early 2000, 
the market, particularly ICE stocks, rose sharply. Thereafter, from June 2000 
onwards it showed a decline which was gradual but consistent. From March 
2001 onwards the decline in the SENSEX was sharp and could be termed a 
crash. There are a number of factors that contributed to this crash, one of 
which is over-reaching by one particular broker and his inability to sustain 
his position. In addition, during the month of January-February 2001 the 
Committee have found indications of large funds being withdrawn from the 
stock market. Whether withdrawal of large sums from the stock market was 
responsible for the crash or the large players withdrew the money because 
they knew that the SENSEX was likely to take a beating was another aspect 
the Committee deliberated upon. The Committee note that the manipulator 
who emerged as a key player in this scam received large sums of money 
from the banks as well as from the Corporate bodies during the period when 
SENSEX was falling rapidly. This led the Committee to believe that there 
was a nexus between the manipulator, banks and the corporate houses. The 
Committee recommend that this nexus be further investigated by SEBI or 
Dept. of Company Affairs expeditiously. The process of liberalization of the 
economy has continued apace and it is market forces that will increasingly 
determine economic trends in the country. With liberalization, the role of the 
Government as a direct player in the financial market will diminish. This 
makes it all the more necessary that the procedures and guidelines laid down 
for the creation and perpetuation of fair and transparent financial markets 
and institutions like stock exchanges and banks have to be more specific, 
and effective mechanisms have to be put in place to ensure that they are 
regularly followed. That job will have to be done by the regulatory 
authorities; viz., SEBI, RBI and DCA in liaison with investigative agencies 
like the Income Tax Department, Enforcement Directorate and the Central 
Bureau of Investigation. Coordination with Government on policy issues 
will, however, continue to be central to good governance as there can be no 
escaping Government’s responsibility to Parliament and the country. 
Therefore, Government must recognize that transactions in the market will 
be insulated from scams only if the relinquishment of Government control 
over the economy is accompanied by strong and effective regulatory bodies. 
This point had also been underlined by the earlier JPC Report, 1993 on 
Irregularities in Securities and Banking Transactions.The proceedings before 
the Committee themselves acted as a catalyst for many reforms in the 
system, which were put in place during the Committee’s pendancy. These 
actions by regulators like SEBI and RBI and by the Ministry of Finance have 
been touched upon in various chapters. The Committee feel that after the 
presentation to Parliament in August and December 1994 of the Action 
Taken Reports (ATRs) on the scam relating to irregularities in securities and 
banking transactions, the will to implement various suggestions of the 
previous Committee petered out. But, as soon as this Committee began its 
sittings and searching questions were asked, SEBI,RBI and other regulatory 
authorities including Ministry of Finance, went into active mode. Had this 
state of affairs prevailed after the Action Taken Report, the probability of the 
present Scam would have been negligible. 
 
B3) Reasons for the Reoccurrence of Security Scam in 2001 Inspite of 
Guidelines Issued by RBI in 1992 
 
The Committee did not have the benefit of a report on the lines of the 
Janakiraman Committee Report which was made available to the previous 
JPC on the scam in securities and banking transactions. Reliable evidence 
was difficult to find and took much time to cull. The Committee had to rely 
on a number of reports that dealt with specific and limited subjects. The 
enquiry reports of the regulators also displayed many gaps which had to be 
filled by securing answers to a very large number of questions asked by the 
Committee. The Special Cell constituted by the Ministry of Finance in June, 
1994 to investigate the nexus between brokers and industrial houses in 
pursuance of the recommendation of the earlierJPC having gone defunct 
since May 22, 1995, without coming out with any tangible findings or 
recommendations for remedial action, is one of the examples of apathy on 
the part of different agencies and departments concerned. The Committee 
were informed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes that on May 19, 1995 
the DGIT (Investigation), Bombay, who headed the Special Cell, had sought 
from CBDT adequate empowerment and administrative support for the Cell 
in the absence of which the Cell was unlikely to reach to any firm 
conclusions about the role of any one or more industrial houses in 
comprehensive manner but the Chairman, CBDT, in his response thereto had 
suggested that due to limited scope of task of the Special Cell no additional 
manpower was required. Also in the minutes of the last meeting of the 
Special Cell held on May 22, 1995, the members recorded that principal 
obstacle in unearthing the exact role of the industrial houses in the scam was 
due to the scope of the Cell was limited only to Bombay region due to which 
investigation into the activities of the suspects outside Bombay was not 
within the jurisdictional authority. Thus, the Special Cell was virtually 
rendered a still-born baby. The lack of concern of Government demonstrated 
in this casual approach to such an important issue is regrettable. This Scam 
is basically the manipulation of the capital market to benefit market 
operators, brokers, corporate entities and their promoters and managements. 
Certain banks, notably private and co-operative banks, stock exchanges, 
overseas corporate bodies and financial institutions were willing facilitators 
in this exercise. The scam lies not in the rise and fall of prices in the stock 
market, but in large scale manipulations like the diversion of funds, 
fraudulent use of banks funds, use of public funds by institutions like the 
Unit Trust of India (UTI), violation of risk norms on the stock exchanges 
and banks, and use of funds coming through overseas corporate bodies to 
transfer stock holdings and stock market profits out of the country. These 
activities went largely unnoticed. While the stock market was rising, there 
was inadequate attempt to ensure that this was not due to manipulations and 
malpractices. In contrast, during the precipitous fall in March 2001 the 
regulators showed greater concern. Another aspect of concern has been the 
emergence of a practice of non-accountability in our financial system. The 
effectiveness of regulations and their implementation, the role of the 
regulatory bodies and the continuing decline in the banking systems have 
been critically examined, for which the regulators, financial institutions, 
banks, Registrars of Co-operative Societies, perhaps corporate entities and 
their promoters and managements, brokers, auditors and stock exchanges are 
responsible in varying degrees. The parameters of governmental 
responsibility have also been taken into account. 
It is the considered view of the Committee that the lack of progress in 
implementing the recommendations of the last Joint Parliamentary 
Committee set up in 1992 to enquire into Irregularities in Securities and 
Banking Transactions emboldened wrong-doers and unscrupulous elements 
to indulge in financial misconduct. The Special Cell constituted by the 
Ministry of Finance in June 1994 to investigate the nexus between brokers 
and industrial houses in pursuance of the recommendation of the previous 
Committee having gone defunct since 22 May 1995, without coming out 
with anytangible findings or recommendations for remedial action, is one of 
the examples of apathy on the part of different agencies and departments 
concerned. The Committee express their concern at the way the supervisory 
authorities have been performing their role and the regulators have been 
exercising their regulatory responsibilities. That the regulatory bodies failed 
in exercising prudent supervision on the activities of the stock market and 
banking transactions, became evident during the course of evidence taken by 
the Committee and this has been detailed in the succeeding chapters. In the 
Committee’s view no financial system can work efficiently even if 
innumerable regulations are put in place, unless there is a system of 
accountability, cohesion and close cooperation in the working of different 
agencies of the government and the regulators. In August 2001, after the 
freeze by UTI in US-64 unit repurchases, the Committee were additionally 
mandated by Parliament to enquire into UTI matters. The Committee find 
that weaknesses in management and regulations of stock exchanges was 
compounded by serious management deficiencies in the UTI and financial 
institutions. 
 
B4)Mr R Janakiraman’s (Ex Deputy Governor of RBI) views on  the 
Reoccurrence of a Security Scam in India and Corporate Governance in 
this regard. 
 
"New brains are out to circumvent rules in the system. Politicians and 
politics have  a major role to play. They is a pressure in PSUs to hire every 
X, Y and Z and hence overstaffing and inefficiency. They have become 
more commercial in operations. These workers are also inefficient and have 
no incentive to work hard. As much as how good work is not rewarded so 
are mistakes not found out and corrected. While people in major banks are 
paid less they have no initiative to work hard. In order to prevent another 
scam from happening a more comprehensive set of guidelines have to be 
prepared. Master Circulars have to be made available to bankers so that they 
work honestly and efficiently. In India justice is so much delayed and people 
often fall into old ways without following guidelines." 
 
